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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 5, 1971

Dear Senator:
Enclosed is the full text of the President's ress
conference yesterday. May I call your attention particularly
to President Nixon's statements on pages 6 through 13. It is
here that the President speaks in some detail to the issues
of strike settlements, restraints on wage and price increases,
the cost of living, and his relationship with Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Arthur Burns.
It is hoped that this material will be of help to you in
responding to questions from your constituents regarding
President Nixon's views and policies on the nation's
•
economy.
Sincerely,

Clark MacGregor
Couns el to the Pre sident
for Congressional Relations

PRESS

CONFERr~NCE

NO. 18

of the

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
EDT
August 4, 1971
Wednesday
11 ~ 36 A. B •

..

In the Oval Office
At The White House

Washington, D. C.
THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, I wanted to
begin this with a brief resume of the conversation I have just
had with the Secretary of State, because · I know the subject will
probably come up in any event.
This is in regard to the Pakistan refugee situation,
to recap what we have done. Insofar as the refugees, who are in
India are concerned, we have provirled $70 million to date for
the refugees, "and we are prepared to provide more. That,
incidentally, is more than all the rest of the nations of the
world put together, so it is a substantial amount.
As far as those in East Pakistan themselves are
concerned, whereas you know there are prospects of famine, in

the event that the crop reports are as bad as they seem t o be,
at this time we have 360,000 tons of grain ready for sh ipme nt
there. We have also alotted $3 million for the chartering of
ships for the purpose of getting the grain into the overcrowded
ports.
·As a further step, the Secretary of State has worked
out with my very strong approval a plan to go to the United
Nations next week to talk to the responsible and appropriate
members of the United Nations, including the U. N. High
Cornmiss·ioner in that office, to see "what additional steps can
be taken on both fronts to help the refugees in India from
East Pakistan, and also to help those who are in East Pakistan
and are presently confronting famine situations.
With regard to a problem that was addressed by the
House yesterday, we do not favor the idea that the United States
should -cut off economic assistance to Pakistan. ' To do so would
simply aggravate the refugee problem because it would mean that
the ability of the Government of Pakistan to work ,,,ith the U.N.,
as it presently has indicated it is willing to do so in
distributing the food supplies, its ability to create some
stability would be seriously jeopardized.
We feel ·that the most constructive role we can play
is to continue our economic assistance to ~Jest Pakistan and,·
thereby to be able to influence the course of events in a way
that will deal with the problem of hunger in East Pakistan
which ... would reduce the refugee flow into India, and which will,
we trust, in the future look toward a viable political
settlement.
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We are not going to engage in public pressure on the
Government of West Pakistan. Th.a t would be totally counterproductive. These are matters that we will discuss only in
private channels.
. ..

.

.

QUESTION: Mr. Presi~ent, can you tell us any more
about your forthcoming trip to China, when it is likely to
occur, and can .you give· us your assessment of what effect
you think this . will have on ending the war in Vietnam?
THE PRESIDENT: As far as the timing is concerned,
I cannot add to what I ~aid .in the original announcement.
It will be befQre May 1 • . The time .will be ·worked out sometime
within the next two . to three months, I would assume, and a
considerable amount of preparatory activity must take place, .
setting up the agenda, setting up the numbers in the official
pal;'ty.
..

•

f

..

, These ar~ matters, of ' c9urse, that must be' discussed
and worked out before the . time
. .of the visit is finally .
announced.
.
.
.

.

,.

Second, and I know a number of you are interested
in who is going, that is a matter still to be decided. It
was raised by. Dr •. Kissinger and by Premier Chou En-lai in their conversations, and ~~ll be worked .out by mutual agreement.
.

-

'

.

As far as . our .party is concerned; .it will be a small
working party. The only ones that presently . are .d efinitely
going are, of course, the Secretary of State and Dr. Kissinger
and myself. -Beyond that, whatever others will be added will
be determined by mutual .agreement .between the parties concern~d.

Now, as to the effect the visit will have and the conversations will have or.. V.ietnam, · I .will not speculate on that subject.
t wil~ only say .that as .'t:he joint announcement indicated,
this .will 'be a wide-ranging discussion of issues concerning
both governments. l.t is not a dis.c ussi.o n that is going to '
lead to instant detente.
What it really is,
is mQving, a~ we have moved,. I
,
believe, inthe situation w,i th, ' reg~rd to the Soviet Union, from
an era of confrontation without communication to an era of
negotiat~ons with discu~sion. It does not mean ·that we
go into these meetings on either side with any illusions
about the wide, differences that we hav~. Our interests 'a re
very different, and both sides
recognize this, .i n: the talks
.
that Dr. Kissinger had, very extended talks he had with Premier Chou
En-lai. We do not. expec~ that these talks will .settle all
. of those differences.
.

• t

•

'\

..

_,. ,
What is important is that we wi~l have o.pened
commuri1cation to ..see where .our differences are irreconcilable
to see ' tha:t th~y can be s~ttled peacefully, and · to find thos.e
a~eas where the United states, which today is the mo~t ·powerfu! nation in the world, can find an agreement with the most
populous nation in the world which potentially in the future
could become the most powerful nation in the world.

,

'

.

,

MORE
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As we look at the peace in 'thQ :." world for the
balance of this century, and for ' that matter the next century,
we must recognize that there cannot be world peace on which
." all the peoples in the world can rely, and in which they have
Such a ~reat stake, unless there is communication between ~nd
some negotiation between these two gzeat superpowers, the
.
Peoples Republic and the United States •
,<

"

have put this in general te~s , because that is
the understanding of the Peoples Republic, Premier Chou En-lai,
and it is our understanding that our agenda \-lil1 be worked
out at a l:.a ter 'point; before the trip it will be very carefully work~d out so that the discussions will deal with the
hard problems as well as the easy ones~
I

'i

e'x pect to make some progress, but to speculate
about what progress will be made on any , particular i~sue, to
speculate, for example, as to what effect this might have on ,
Vietnam, would not serve the interests of constructive talks.
We

~':

.

.

QUESTION:

Can '! ask a relate.d policy .question on

Vietnam?
,
Sure.

THE PRESIDENtr:

There have been some, sugge~tions " in91l:1din9
some indirect hints from China], that a negotiat1ng'forum 1nvolv1ng ar
Asian conference to be held in Asia, pri'marily with Asian
participants, but the United States as well, might be a better
forum for 'negotiating a settlement in Vietnam. Can you speak
to that?
QUESTION:

,

Hr. Bailey, the question of whether
there should be an ' all-Asian conference ,"'wi th the Government
of the 'P e'o ples Republic participating, as you know, has risen
several times over the past few months, and was raised before
our announcement was made.
THE ' PRESIDENT:

As far as we are concerned, we will consider any

proposal that might contribute to a more peacefu1 situation
in the Pacific and in the world. HONever, at . this point there
is no understanding be~~een the United States and the Peoples.
Republic as to whethe+, o'r not Qut of this meeting sho,u ld
come that kind, of pr~posal~ ,
.
Let me say on that score, there were no conditions
asked for ori either side, and none accepted. There were no
deals made on either side, or accepted, none offered and none
accepted. This is a discussion which will take place with
both sides knowing in advance that there are problems,
but with both sides well prepared. Thi~ is the secret of
any successful summit meeting.
'
'.

l' "

As you know, parenthetically, I have ~lways take~
somewhat of a dim view of summitry when it c,omes in an unp~e,"' ; '"
pared fornl. But both sides will be well prepare,d, wel,l in " ' . .'~
advance, on all points of major difference, and we will discuss any points of difference that could affe,~t'l ,th.e/ peace of
the world.
" , ' ~:', ~~"';:,~,
I,"

MORE
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QUESTION: Mr. President, is there any diplomatic
reason you ~ight not visit t~e Soviet Union ,before going
to Peking? That 'was sug~ested~
•

~

#

..

..

t.

~.

•

•

•

•

PRESIDENT: ' In view of the announcement we' have
m~de on ' o~r vis~t to Pekins, tha~ . wi~l be the first visit that
I 'w ill make. ' Obviously, it ' takes " a great deal o~ ~ime to
~
prepare a 'visit and to attempt now to visit -- and the ~oviet Union,
I am sure D feels exactly the same \'iay· ;. . ·... to attE:inp';: to rush
around and have a summit meeting in ~'1oscow before we go to
Peking 'would not be: in the interest of either country~
.'
..
•

\

,

'"

p

THE'

"

.,'

.'

.

'.

.

'

t would add 'this point, too:

When Foreign ~·tinister
Gromyko was l' here, we discussed the possibility of a possible
summit meeting, and we had a very candid discussion. , ' He
agreed and said that his government leaders agreed with my
,position, which was that a meeting at the highest level should
take 'place 'and would be useful only when there was something
substantive to 'discuss that could not be handled in other
channels •
"~
, . :'
'.
•

4Ir

"'..

/'

.,

ro.

With r~gard to the Soviets, I should, also point out
that 'we are :making ' verysignifieant prbgress
Berlin. We
are making good progress on SALT. Discussions are still continuing on the Mideast, although there I will not speculate
about what the prospects for success are in view of the fact
, that Mr. S;sco is presently i,n t~~ area exploring with the
" g, overnwe~ts cQncerned ~.'-'.ha·t · the pos~i!)ilitie9 of ~.or.~e interi:u sattlernent 10okJ.ng to:ward a . ,final ~ett.l~ment
mn.y be., " .
.
.

on

.

......

.

I

.

, .""

<

1

. . ...

•

.•

~

,

<

,

...

.
r~'l(~nticIled thes~ ~h.ree , ,~re~s in",\!hict,L \,re are n '3gotiating
,

.

...

;Having
with the Soviet Union, I ' will add ' that if the time comes, as
it may come, and both sides ~' realize this, then the final
breakthrough in any of these areas can take place only at the
highest level, and then there will be a meeting. But as far
as the timing of the' me~ting before the visit to ~eking, that
would not be' ·"an appropriate 'thing to do.
.
~

•• '

•

•

t

I

.

QUESTION: I was thinking of such a thing as a
settlement on the SALT talks.
•

.

I "

,

.,

,
,

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Theis, _when I said there was
good prog:ress 'b'e ing made' dn SALT, it is still a very ~e, ch
nical and sticky ' problem "for both sides, because , 1'1; involves
our vital interests" Let me emphasize that in SA:LT, ,p oth sides
are asked to make an agreement which limits' that~ · Thi's is not
unilateral. We, on our part, will be having very severe limitations with regard to, our defensive capability, the ABM.
They, on their part, will' have ' limitations on the~r qffensive
capabili'ty ,t:~Hi r ~:-I \.:~l d '\.'~P'
'. of offer..si-V€!
missiles. '·'
.
.. -. .
.

"

"

•

•

.:..

.

~

.

~

• -.

•

~ 06

•

•

•

•

' . , .

Neither side c~ make ,those de~isions lightly,
without verY', very.hasfc discussions, but:' .:the ~act that we ,
have at the highest level committed 'o urselves to working
toward an agreement simultaneously ~his year on ,both those
issues, and the fact that since the talks at Helsinki began ,
that we have' made
progress, giyes hope ' that we are going to
•
make an . arrd.n~! ~ ~!lent
0

4

t'

.

....

..

( .. -t,

"

.' . But to speculate that mayb-e we are going to get
that done before we go to Peking, I think, would be itl·- advised.
,; . r'"
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QUESTION: ' Mr. President, why have you not accepted
the Viet 'Cong propo ~3als after all these weeks of probing, or

given some formal reply?

,"

THE PRESIDENT: .. I have noted some criticism in the
press about the fact that Ambassador Bruce had to leave
August 1st. Incidentally, I am most grateful that he stayed
' an extra month, becau;se his doctor got hold of me and , said
he 'should have left' July 1st. In any event, his having left ,
August 1st, and Mr. Porter not being able to arrive until the ' latter
pctrt of August, there has been some speculation, and I understand this, criticism in the press and the Senate and the House
that the Administration is not intere~ted in n~gotiating a
settlement. that ~ we are not considering the various proposals
that have been made by the VC and North Vietnamese.
,

"

Now, just so the members of" the press will not get
. out "on a limb with regard to predicting \-That we are or are
not doing, let nl~' make one statement and t~en I will go no
further.
We are very actively pursuing negotiations on
Vietnam in established channels. The record, when it finally
comes out, wilf answer all the critics'as far as the activity
cf
this Government in pursuing negoti'a tions in establishe~
channels. It would not be useful to negot1ate 1n the newspapers if we want to
have those negotiations
succeed.
.
.
.
,

' . .

I

•

"

•

.

am not predicting that the negotiations will
succeed..
am~aying, <
however,
that ,. as far as the united
.
.
States 15 concerned, we have gone and are g01ng the extra
, mile on negotiations ' in established channels. You can
interpret - that abY way you want, b~t do not interpret it in
a way that indicates that the ' United States i~ missin~ this
opportunity or that opportunity, or another one, to negotiate.
I
I

.

~

,

,

l'4r. President; one ,of the , points being
mentioned in the comments on the negotiations is the election
in South Vietnam this fall. 'Is that a factor that does have
some bearing on the pace of the negotiations?
QUES'T ION:

"

THE PRESIDENT:

It has certainly in terms of the

North Vietnamese. As you know, the stumbling block for them
in negotiations really is; ,the polit1"cal settlement. As "t:hey
look at the elec~ion' this 'fall ', they feel that unless that
election comes out in' a way ,that a candidate they can, support,
or at' least that they are 'riot as much against as they are
President Thieu, but unless
it comes out ' that way, it will be
,
very .difficult for them to have a negotiated settlement.
With regard to the elections, let me emphasize our
position. Our position is one of compiete neutrality in these
elections. Under .!ui.Lassado:,,::,
.
Bunker I s ski.llful , direction, ~,~~ ~have
made it clear to, all parties' concerned that , we are not support~
ing any candidate; that we will accept the ,verdict of the
people of South Vietnam.
, ,
"
"

'

have) ,noted, for example, that President ,Thieu .
has invited observers to come from other nations to witness
the election. I hope observers , do go. r thi!1k they. "'ill :find, I
hope the~' ~~' il1 find 9 as they ~id ';.1hen they ohs(~rved" ,previous
~lecti9ns in VietnarJ; that by JilOSt standards they were fair.
I

MORE

.,

..
•
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As far as observers from this country are concerned,
we have, of co,u rse, seve,r al members of the Senate.,,~~nd others
that have , indicated, a desire to go. W~, of course, · have no
obj ection . to that. We want a fair election and we, of., cot;lrse,
have some observers on the scene in the person of the Ambassador •.and his st.a ff .who · wil~ watch that., elec~~on • .
~

..

..

'

,

QUESTION: Mr.' Presi,d ent, the last time . you g,a ve s ,~me
stock market advice to, us, it turned out pretty well. What .
would you, do now, buy o~ sell?
With regard to the stock market, I
suppose my advice sho~ld not be given much weight because I
am not in the market. It is so easy to make predictions
where your own assets are not involved. '
THE PRESIDENT:

I will say this:

wo~ld

not sell the united States
economy short at this point. And long term, I would not be selling my investments, in the American economy whether it is in
stocks or real estate or what have you; selling them in a
panicky way •
I

. The stock market· has corne up, even at its present
level of 850, 230 points since I made that prediction. , I can
on~y say that my long-range predi,c tion for this economy is
still what I said at the first ~f this year.
the first o'f this year, when the very same people
had wri tten -- and I have
read :the n€~~s r:lagazines and, business
..
magazines,
not, of course, any of the columns you had
written this week -- but ·I heard all the rest this , week, and
the gloomy predictions, about ~he , economy and it is going down
and there is nothing good about ,it. I read them also f 'o r
November of ' last year; exactly
the same gloominess and ,same
.'
words, and so forth.
l'i..

\

and

;

"

"

I said then, and I ,think all of you 'were present then,
1 thought
1971 would be a goo,d year for the ~conomy, and
19~2 ' would be a very good year.
I stand by that., vfuen we
look at the first half of this year, it is not what people
said about the economy; it is what they do about it that
counts.
GNP is up a record $52 billion.

Retail sales now
in June, and the first indications as far as July are concerned, it will stay a~ this level, are at record highs.
Consumer spending is at a record high. Construction,' particularly in housing, are near record highs. Inventories-and this is another indication of what will happen to the
•
future for those who may be thinking of investing their money 1.n
businesses -- inventories are a~normally low in view of the
higrl). level of r~tail sales. ,
.'
this tells me ~s " that th~re is a lot of steam
in the boiler in this econ9my, and you cannot cortinue to have
high retail sales "and low inventories w~thQut eventually
star.ting to rebuild. Therefore, my projection for the balance
of this , year . ~s t~~t the ~co~omy will, con~inue to move up as
it has moved up in the first half. ,(; .
~fuat

. .

-J,i"~k'"

,

.,
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That doesn't mean that there will not be aberra, tions ' in the monthly figures. It does mean, however, that the
economy has a great deal of strength in it. This is a period
when it is absorbing ' almost 2 million people who have been let
out of defense plants and the Armed Forces, and is abso~bing
that with a lower rate of unemployment than was the case
in 1961, 1962, 1963, which were the last three peacetime years
before Vietnam when the unemployment rate, as you recall,
averaged 6 percen't .
'
.

QUESTION:

Mr. President, in that connection, to

continue that, does ~that ' mean that you , are still resolutely
opposed to any incomes policy or, .specifically, wage-price
controls?
THE PRESIDENT: I think, Peter, it is well to
identify incommpolicies and wage-pric~ controls for what
they are and what they are not, because, as a matter of
fact -- and this gives me an opportunity to set the rec,o rd
straight with regard to some greatly blown up differences that
I am Supposed to have with my very good friend Arthur Burns,
' and perhaps ' you WEre too polite to ask that direct question -QUESTION:

Well, I will ask it.
<

THE PRESIDENT:

up, so I anticipated it.

thought that would be the followLet me ' get at it ~his way:
I

Arthur Burns, in terms of monetary policy and in
terms · of fiscal policy, has followed a course that I think
is the most responsible 'and statesmanlike of any Chairman of
the Federal Reserve in my memory. In other words, you have
seen an expansionary monetary policy, and that is one of .the
reasons we have had an expansionary economy in the first six
months of this year.
He has also
stood :firt~ly wjAth this Admini,stration
in its responsible fiscal policy, resistin9, for example,
spending above what the economy would produce at full capacity. He has strongly supported me in those efforts.
That brings me to an area where he has taken a
very unfair shot. Within this Administration ; tile· Office of
Budget and Management, on 'a ' reorganization ,plan two months
ago, recommended that the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, because he basically is our central banker, should be raised
to the same status of the central bankers abroad. I enthusiastically approved the idea. However, when the matter was
raised with Dr. Burns by my associates, he indicated that
neither he nor any other individual in a· high position . in
Government should take a salary increase at a time that the
President was going to have to tak~ some strong measures,
as I am going to take to liri1i t ~alary increases in
other areas of Government, including, for example, blue collar
workers.

•

So, consequently, while there is not any question but
that the Federal Reserve position will eventually pe raised
to the Level I position that was recomrne~ded, Arthur Burns
and, inCidentally, George Shultz, who is also on this list as
a recommendation of the Ash Council, Art~ur Burns and George
Shultz being the responsible men that they were, asked that
there not be an example set by them of a pay increase
lvtORE

...

.

,.
•
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~

which would make it very difficult for us to deal .,effectively
and responsibly wi th p,ay increases in other sectors of the
Government. So we find that Burns agrees, that I agree with
Burns, let's put it that way, very strongly on his monetary
policy, on his fiscal policy, the question he has raised with
regard to an incomes policy.
we talk about an incomes policy, let's see what
he is not for. He is unalterably opposed, as I am, to the
Galbraith scheme, which is supported by many of our Democratic
Senators, I understand, . of permanent wage and price controls.
p'e nnanent wage and price controls in America would stifle the
American economy, its dynamism, its productivity, and would
be, I think, a mortal blow to the United States as a firstclass economic power.
~fuen

'.

On the other hand, it is essential that Government
use its p~wer where it can be effective to stop the escalation,
or at least temper the escalation in the wage-price spiral.
"That is why we moved on cons.truction, and we have been somewhat Isuccessful, from .16 down to: .9 percent. That is whywe moved
to · roll back an oil price recently.
.

.1n

.

As far as the two recent settlements, the one
railroads and the one in steel, on the plus side, ~he fact that
they were settled was positive; the fact, too, that in the case
of railroads ', they spoke to the problem of productivity by
modification of work rules, ' and the fact that the steel settlement also spoke to the pr~blem of productivity by setting up
productivity councils, that was constructive •
.On the other hand, . I would be less ,-, than candid if ·
I were not to say, and I know ' t~e leaders of the steel and
railroad industry know this, that this kind of settlement
where a wage increase leads to a price increase, and particularly in steel, where the industry is already noncompetitive
'with foreign imports, is not in the interest of America, not
in the in~erest of labor, and not in the interest of industry.

Dr. Burns, without being completely specific, has
only suggested the idea should be considered. That is why
Secretary Connally said we welcome the move by several Republican
Senators to hold hearings concer~ing wage and price supports.
That·· is why Dr. Burns s:a id we sho'uld move to attempt to
temper these incrEbases.
.
l

The problem here
.. . is, how can we move wi thout~, putting
the American economy in a' straitj,acket? In other words, as
Secretary Connally raised the question in his statement this
morning, flAre we to have ' criminal penalties? Are, for example,
the wage-price guidelines to affect all the examples down to ·
the neighborhood filling station or the grocery . store , or the
meat market, as the case might be, or will they affec.t only
major ~ iridustries?

As far as this Administration is concerned, I can
say this: I have asked the Secretary of Labor to bring to my
attention every major wage-price negotiatior which may be
coming up in the future, and I will use the power of this
office to the extent it can be effective to see that those ·
negotiations are as responsible as possible.
MORE

•
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On Septernber 21st, we ' will have a meeting of our

Productivity Commission, and Subject .iA n ~n that meeting
will be this same problem, because as we look at America's
trade balances, which have deteriorated over the past 10
years, but as we look at l~erica's competitive position,
it is essential that American industry and American labor sit
down together and determine whether, at a time when we are
in a race, we no longer can be Number 1 simply because we were
' that
' big and that
strong after World War I, whether we. deter- .
.
.
rn~ne we are go~ng to get out : of the race or whether we are go~ng
to tighten 'o ur belts and be respon~ible in wage-price decisions
so that we can continue to be competitive in the world.
~.

...

,

That speaks to the problem of an incom~policy,
this meeting that we will have. The only question of dif- .
ference between Arthur Burns, and some Senators have rai~ed
this question, is the degree to which, in tackling these
individual wage settlements, we have compUlsion, we have
criminal penalties. I don't think they want compulsion or
crimIinal .pena'r ties.
.

I

<

Then the question is '~ H. ~ far will persuasion
go "
. 'oui record shows -that in most cou~tries abroad that
hav~ tried it, except" for very small coun~ries th~t are
tightly controlled, persuasion alone will work for only three
to four months.
<

.

'

;

r

~

' So' as far as we are concerned, I am glad to con-sider recommendations for tackling the problem. I will tackle
them, and I am serving notice now that we are going to take
up the problem with the Productivity Commission. We are going
to look at each individual settlement in major industries oNhere
there is going to be wage-price negotiations, and use ~he
inf ! fu ence -we can to keep them in line',' and in addition to that,
we will consider a recommendation on wage-price boards. But
I will reject it if I find, and I have yet to find any recom.;' 'mendation that did not have this in9~edient in it, if I find
! ' -that it would impose a new bureaucracy with enormous criminal
powers, to fasten itself 6n the American economy. That, I "
think, would do far more barm than good.
,

.
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QUESTION: In the same line to follow up that
question, if the settlement in the steel industry and particularly the raise in prices which was recently announced is not good
foi" tr;.E- country' · {.~r:.c\. .no·t g(> 0 c" fer In~~:c:c ene. PEtnager lent.7, V:tY <10 you
not c nll .iL t!"'~ e le; {;c rg or . tile st\i;el incust ry ··~nt.: use YOUI:
influence to . g2t them to (;~1 f·n0(~ t he ir"cre .:··;..s..:.~ ir !:J rices and then if
nece ~sary other pa rt s of the: settlen':.6nt which are so inimicable
to the country?
,
THE PRESIDENT~ Calling in the steel industry and
getting them to change would not be effective. As you may
recall, in one instance earlier this year, we were able to get
a steel rollback. That had a ' 't emporary beneficial effect. But
at a time that the steel industry has negotiated a settlement
of this nature, at a time when its profits at 2-1/2 percent are
the lowest of any major industry, to tell the steel industry
that after they have negotiated a settlement they must roll back
their price and run at a loss is simply unrealistic. They are
not going to do it.
The longer term answer here is ' for the steel
industry, and this is what we have a~dressed ourselves to, and
the labor to recognize that now that they have had their
settlement, nO'\1 that labor has gotten a good . increase, an
increase consis~ent with aluminum and others, now that steel
found it necessary to raise prices that this may be· ,good
temporarily for tot rA ~ut in t~l e long run it ·.r ill sii~ply mea.."l less
steel so l e arlQ less jobs ~nd that i::z why ~i1e are zeroing in 0:.
the productivity sid0 ~e C2U SG incrocses in pro~uctivity cen b~
th~ ,only ans ' leY' 'h1t~ere a wage incr~ nse of this kind t ,::kes
pli'ceo
QUESTION~

Mr. President, a minute ago you men~ioned
something about doing something about wages for government
employees.
THE PRESIDENT~ Yes, one of the problems, difficult
problems, I confronted last year and thc':1t I ,yoill conf ..ont again
this yea~ is 'a recommendation to increase the wages for blue
collar workers within the gqvernment. I have examined that
situation and I have determined that an increase in the blue
collar wage scale would not be in the interests of our fighting
the inflation battle.
Speaking to the same point, we have a situation with
regard to the Congress and some of its appropriations bills.
We are trying to keep our budget within the full employment
limits for 1972.
The Congress already has exceeded our budget by $5.4
billion. That includes mandatory spending which they have
imposed upon us and additions to the appropriations bills.
Before they get through with the appropriations process I hope
that comes down.
But that will be highly inflationary unless the
Congress speaks to that problem more effectively. What I was
indicating, in other words, Herb, I am indicating in advance the
decision that I do not intend to approve the wage increase
relative to the blue collar workers in the government. Under
those circumstances, I could not, of course, approve an increase
in salaries for people as underpaid basically as Dr. Burns is,
considering what he could get on the outside or Dr. Shultz is,
considering what he could get on the outside.
~10RE
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QUESTION~

--

How many people are there in the blue

collar area?
THE PRESIDENT : I don't have that but ' it is a
significant number. Incidentally, I think it is an equitable
decision because they have had $ ::i':-.9 9ubst~J1ti a l increi1 '~e.:3 in t~·~;~
'~'& :J'~o
It i :J a '1u~~ti on o f phether 'jl ~:; jU;1 t co~tinue for a short
time.
QUESTION: Sir, you also mentioned guidelines in a
manner that suggested that you might accept the concept of numerical
guidelines, did you mean to suggest that?
No. What I meant to say was that my
study of the situation indicates that guidelines in this country
have always failed. They have never worked. G~idelines in
other industrial . count ~ ies including Canada, for example, and
Britain, have worked only for a short time and then have fallen
because guidelines basically connote voluntary compliance and
voluntary compliance goes on only for a brief time.
THE

PRESIDENT~

Now, as far as what I am saying, it is t :lat O'..1r approact.
at this time is a selective one to take those particular
industries that are .coming up .for bargaining and to use our
influence as ~ffectively as we can to see that those settlements
are responsible.
Secondly, that as far as a wage price board is
concerned, that it would be considered favorably only if the
hearings that are going to be taken· in this field, only if
the hearings can convince me that enforcing an incomes policy
could be accomplished without stifling t :-l® econo~y
0

It is the problem, in other words, of enforcement I
because I corne back to this fundamental proposition: I have yet
to find except for the extremists on the left, and I don't say
this in a conderllning way, it is only an obs'ervation, but the
extremists on the left of the economy spectrum have always
favored a ~otally government~controlled economy.
They pelieve that. I don't believe it. They believe
that we should .have permanent wage and price controls and that
government should petermine what wages should be and what prices
should be. I don't believe that. Dr. Burns does not' believe
that if you have read his 3'-,seC:1es ever t h.::.. years . F e is a ~trong
opponent of that.

-

The question is, how can we address ourselves to the
problem of wages and prices without having those mandatory
criminal penalty features '.vhich would lead us to something we
all are trying to avoid. This is why this is a matter for
discussiono
It is not one yet for decision but I will continue
to work on individual settlements as I have said.
~10RE
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QUESTIGN: Mr. President, would it be fair to say,
then, that in view of what you said there and what you said
earlier that you will consider recommendations of the wage
and price board, that you are giving renewed and perhaps more
favorable consideration to some form of wage-price board;
assuming that they don't have penalties? .
•

"."
" THE PPESIDENT~ No. . I am saying that I shall
;.... ". cont-i nue the poli'c y of moving aggressively on individual
settlements on a cas'8 -by-case basis. Secondly, I will
addre$~ ~ this particular pioblem in a meeting with the major
leaders of .~~erican 'industry and American labor at the
Productivity Commission meeting on September 21. Third,·
with regard to wage-price boards, I have still not been
convinced that we .. can move in that direction and be effective.
However., .
Secretary Connally, in his statement this morning,
rais~d all the questions that should' be raised on that.
As
far as we are concerned, we have an open mind in ·terms of
examining the various proposals to ' se~ if th~re is a new approach
which we may not have thought of.
.
have serious doubts that they will find such
a new approach, but I CO want to indicate that we will examine
it because we all agree that the wage-p'rice spiral is a
sig~ificant danger to t~: i3expanding economy.
The question is
what do we do about it, t~i'thout going all the way to a totally
controlled economy.
I

.
QUESTION: ~1r. Presiden't, ' Dr~ Burns, before the Joint
Economic Committee, said he didn't think we wer~ ' making much
progress against inflation. Do you think we are?
.

THE PRESIDENT: I read Dr. Burns statement quite
carefully. What he was saying is what I would say_ I would
say it with regard to inflation and unemployment. I am never
satisfied ~nd never ~.,ill be satisfied, and anybody in the free
economy is never satisfied and ;> r.,·~! ~~6 ne~.· ':.:.r ""::: ::, ·t ': ~.'! f i e(, n ith
an~thing except · perfection

,I

That doesn't mean that we are going to reach
perfection. ~'Vith regard to inflation, I ~.,ill just point to
the numbers. Inflation, which, of course, was boiling along
-; ~hen we came into office in January of '19 69 '~ reached its peak
in 1970, six percent. Then the CPI dropped to 4 percent in .
the first six months of 1969. Now, 4 percent is still too
high, but that is progress.
The GNP deflator, which of course goes far beyond
the consumer price index, as you know, the GNP deflator covers
.
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enough, but it is progress.
In the last month the CPI was higher than the
average it has been for the first five months. We all know that
these month-to-month ' variations are not ~·:~~C' t counts. }\1y view
is that we are making progress against inflation, but it is
going to require continued strong policies on the part of the
Administration with the cooperation of the Congress in limiting
our budget expenditures to full capacity or full employment
revenues. That is the battle we will continue to wage and it
will also need cooperation from labor and management on limiting
the wage price spiral.
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On the unemployment _f 'r ont; '1,e h ave ·a sou\ewhat similar
problem. In the last three peacetime years before the Kdr~an
t!ar expenditures began to hypo the economy, 1961, 1962, ·'a11c. 1963,
unemployment in those years av~raged six percent. We, - at this
point, have brought unemploymerit below six percent, not : ~s much
as we woul~ like. It reac~ed its ~eak in Ja~uary. It was·-6.2.
What the figures will ' be for this month you will know on ' F~iday.
I c.on r t know ,,-, hat they are myself. I ~lil1 read t h is a:; you eo and
that is the '-!lay it should be.
".
-',

-,

--

:

But in any e'v ent, the unemployment curve is ' C:OtJ\!n.
Six point two "\Tas 't he high and~ we are now below si)( .pe~;cent.
believe that it \'1i 11 continue, with monthly aberrations', on
a downward course
through
the balance
of the year.
, .:·t'
::
•

. . J.
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•

~ believe that
pr~'dicti-o'n that \l>1e

.

as we go into 1972, I still stick
t-lith my
shall see unemployment continue to
move downward and that 1972, for that year, will be a very good
year.
ltlould point out one final thing
on the unemployment factso A.s I have often pointed out, as of this morning I
looked at the numbers, over 2 million P~ericans have been let out
of the 2.rrned services and out of defense plants since we
started to wind down the 'far in Vietnam.
I

If they were in the services or in the defense plants

at the present time, unemployment would be 4.3. But the other
side of that coin is that casualties when we came in were 300 a
week. This week, last week, they were 12.
just think the price is too high to pay. We
believe that our goal of a new prospect of low
unemploYlnent but \flith peace and not at the cost of war is one
that Americans are willing to work toward.
I

We are going to achieve that goal.
Getting back to
the stock market question I I will simply say thiS: ~~verybody else
has been prophetic about the future. I think the prophets who
presently say that the American economy is on the skids, that
we have made no progress on inflation, that the economy is not
moving up, who ignore the $52 billion increase in GNP, who
ignore the increase in retail sales, who ignore the strong,
positive elements in the economy, I think by the end of this year
that they are going to look bad so I will go out on the limb
to that effect but by the end of tns year I might look bad.
Let's just hope that they do rather than myself
because all of us are involved.
QUESTIOtl: On the casualties, Mr. President, do you
think that the figures of 12 per week in that category, are they
an aberration or does your policy envision them to continue to
decline during this year?

No, they are not an aberration. T.h ey
are the result, frankly, of first an American withdrawal.
American forces in Vietnam today, as you can tell from reading
the reports, are in defensive positions. We are frankly just
defending the area in which we have responsibility and there are
less of them
THE PRESIDENT:
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Consequently, our ,casualties go down for that
reason. Secondly, they are down for another reason. The
enemy doesn't have the punch it had because another point to
look at is that South Vietnamese casualties are also sub', " . stantially down fr'8m what they were. What has happened is
that the two operations, Cambodia and Laos, so very severely .
disrupted the enemy's ability to wage offensive actions that
for both Americans and South vietnamese the level of fighting
is down.
There again will be aberrations up and down, I
would assume. Nobody can predict that. But the war is being
wound down and as far as Americans are concerned, we trus ·t it
will continue to go down.
THE PRESS:

Thank you, Mr.
END
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